For British international lawyers, Hersch Lauterpacht is still a dominant presence. His work is a benchmark, an intellectual paradigm encapsulating an approach to international law which has been profoundly influential and which continues to exert a sway in British institutions. The thesis of this paper is that Lauterpacht's discharge of the judicial function constituted the implementation of his theory of international law.
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The Grotian Tradition', supra note 9, at 330; cf. Human Rights, at 74 where be argues that natural law doctrine constitute* "that higher law which must forever remain the ultimate standard of fitness of all positive law, whether national or international'; and also 'Kelsen's Pure Science of Law' Human Rights, \00etseq.
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The Grotian Tradition', supra note 9, at 332-333; see also Human Rights, 103 et seq, and 'Kelsen's Pure Science of Law', supra note 15, at 428-429. In this brief article, Lauterpacht reserves his criticism solely for Kelsen's rejection of natural law doctrine, which he sees as 'snpendded to the main structure of his doctrine -principally for the sake of argumentative advantages, but ultimately to the disadvantage of the whole lystern' (at 424).
Lauterpacht's concern with natural law conditions his discussion of the fundamental presupposition of international law. He notes that positivists, in particular Kelsen, despite his rejection of natural law theory, shared with Grotius the same basis of international law, namely pacta sunt servanda. Although this was a precept of natural law for Grotius, for Kelsen it was simply the meta-legal initial hypothesis of the legal order. Lauterpacht adopted the Grotian position, ultimately concluding that 'the rule pacta sunt servanda is the initial hypothesis of the Law of Nations', 23 basing this in natural law 24 and the social nature of man:
Some prefer to consider it as being in itself of an extra legal character for the reason that the validity of the ultimate source of legal obligation cannot, logically, be explained in terms of law; Grotius grounded its binding force in the law of nature ... the difference is perhaps not so profound as may appear at first sight 23 Lauterpacht saw this simply as a 'methodological difference' of which 'we cannot be sure of its practical relevance'.
26
By presenting these alternatives in this way, Lauterpacht demonstrates not only his debt to Grotius, but also to his teacher Kelsen. Kelsen's theory has often been misrepresented as self-defeating. The claim has been made that the pure theory's attempt to eliminate value from law itself presupposes value or lapses into sterility.
27 This is to misconceive Kelsen's enterprise, which was essentially epistemic rather than substantive. Accordingly, there is no contradiction in arguing that Lauterpacht, while adhering fundamentally to a.natural law position, understood law within a Kelsenite framework.
This influence is particularly clear in Lauterpacht's explanation of the role played by general principles of law in international legal argumentation where he wraps a substantive natural law approach within Kelsenite legal epistemology. The importance of general principles in Lauterpacht's construction of the international judicial function cannot be underestimated. Not simply do they constitute a method by which an international judge can avoid delivering a non liquet, but general principles play a central role in Lauterpacht's conception of the Rule of Law in international society. Moreover, the latter is perceived in a manner closely associated with Kelsenite doctrine, which Lauterpacht emphasized in his brief commentary on Kelsen 28 -namely, the gradual concretization of law. 23 la contrast to the opinion expressed in Function of Law, Lauterpacht irgues in The Grotian Tradition' that pacta sunt servanda gives a basis for tbe 'volitional Law of Nations', that is international law which is bated on agreement, 'whether expressed in a treaty or implied by custom' (supra note 9, at 354).
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Lauterpacht also saw substantive general principles of law as expressive of natural law, tee infra.
23
The Grotian Tradition', supra note 9, at 354, tec 353-354. On pacta sunt servanda and natural law, tee also Fltzmaurice, supra note 4, vol. Q, at 597-598, and his "Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law', in F.M.van Asbeck (ed.), Symbolae Venijl (1958) 153, at 162 ft seq.
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The Grotian Tradition', supra note 9, at 331; tee also Function of Law, 418-420. 27
On this see, for instance, Tur and Twining, 'Introduction', in R. 
EL Law and the Rule of Law
Lauterpacht located the International Court at the centre of the international legal order, arguing that the Court's original and primary purpose was to decide disputes between States and, by fostering the rule of law among diem, to contribute to international peace. That purpose has not wholly materialized owing to die political conditions prevailing after the Second World War and to the reluctance of Governments to confer upon the Court the requisite jurisdiction. These conditions are not necessarily of a permanent character ... [I]t is that purpose which, notwithstanding temporary setbacks, must remain die abiding purpose of die judicial organization of die community of nations under die rule of law.
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Within this structure, legal officials, such as judges, play an indispensable role in securing the Rule of Law as when they apply 'die necessary abstract rule of law to die concrete case, they create the legal rule for the individual case before them 1 :
30
The object of law to secure order must be defeated if a controversial rule of conduct may remain permanently a matter of dispute ... it is essential for the rule of law that there should exist agencies bearing evidence, and giving effect, to the imperative nature of the law. The law's external nature may express itself either in the fact that it is a precept created independently of the will of the subjects of the law, or that it is valid and continues to exist in respect of d>e subjects of die law independently of dieir will.
'
The importance of die judicial function permeates Lauterpacht's concept of law. This is expressed in his argument for obligatory jurisdiction that is itself a consequence of the emphasis which Lauterpacht gives to die gradual concretization of law. Apart from the search for a basic norm, this is die most prominent aspect of Lauterpacht's concept of law which is primarily associated with Kelsen. 32 Norms are relatively indeterminate as they cannot specify all die conditions for their application:
The actual operation of the law in society is a process of gradual crystallization of die abstract legal rule, beginning with the constitution of the State, as the most fundamental and abstract body of rules, and ending with the concrete shaping of the individual legal relation by a judgement of a court, or by an adjudication or decision of an administrative authority, or by an agreement of die interested parties. This doctrine obliterates any distinction between law and obligation or, more precisely, legal relationships. The latter constitute only the specific application of the former. This assimilation of legal material has a peculiar consequence for the presentation of international law:
The actual content of international law is even more meagre than may appear from its presentation in text-books, when we consider that most rules of international law are concerned with a definition of subjective rights established by particular or general treaty. Rights of this nature would hardly appear in a presentation of a system of municipal law which is composed of abstract rules of an objective nature.-'
5
There is thus an apparent tension at the heart of Lauterpacht's concept of law. On the one hand, law lies in the legal relationships established by the parties inter se, while yet equally on the other hand, law comprises precepts which exist independently of the parties' will.
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Further, Lauterpacht sees law as an imperative system, that is as a series of commands directed at the subjects of the legal system to regulate their behaviour. Given his adhesion to pacta sunt servanda as the fundamental presupposition underpinning the system, once a state's agreement is given, whether tacitly or expressly, to a norm then the resulting rule binds the state independently of its will. Regardless of whether pacta sunt servanda is a customary norm or initial hypothesis, it constitutes a command, i.e. a rule existing independently of the will of the parties. It is of no consequence that in the international sphere the command does not issue from a political superior. Law may be a command without being the command of an organized political community ... law may be a command merely by virtue of its external nature.
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Moreover, Lauterpacht's deontic array appears to be conditioned by that of Kelsen, for whom 'the legal duty is the central and only essential element of the legal system'.
38 It must be conceded that, albeit in the context of a discussion of the Perma- This statement should not be taken at literal face value, as one of the tenets of Lautcipacht's theory is that international law is complete and offers a solution for any problem which might arise. This is a position which Lauterpacht must necessarily adopt in order that he can sustain his vision of an international Rule of Law. This requires that all disputes are justiciable and thus can be solved by the application of law:
The completeness of the rule of law -as distinguished from the completeness of individual branches of statutory or customary law -is an a priori assumption of every system of law, not a prescription of positive law. It is impossible, as a matter of a priori assumption, to conceive that it is the will of the law that its rule should break down as the result of the refusal to pronounce upon claims.... There are no gaps in the legal system taken as a whole. The first function of the legal organization of the community is the preservation of peace,... But this primordial duty of the law is abandoned and the reign of force is sanctioned as soon as it is admitted that the law may decline to function by refusing to adjudicate upon a particular claim.... Under the normal rule of law it is inconceivable that a court should pronounce a non liquet because of the absence of law.
41
Lauterpacht's assumption of the completeness of the legal order does not entail that law positively regulates all conceivable activity: There is always open to the Tribunal the possibility of rejecting the claim on the ground of the absence of an agreed rule of law supporting the demand.' 42 He argues that die material completeness of the legal system should not be assessed by reference to the possible range of objects which it might regulate, but only by the scope of those which are deemed capable of legal regulation at any given time:
The absence of direct legal regulation of a particular matter is the result of the determination, or at any rate the acquiescence, of the community in the view that, in the particular case, the needs of society and the cause of justice are best served by freedom from interference. To that extent it may correctly be said that the absence of explicit legal regulation is tantamount to an implied recognition of legally protected freedom of action. From this point of view the law, in the fulfilment of its basic function, namely, to ascertain through its organs whether any particular claim is entitled to legal protection or not, is unlimited and faultlessly perfect.' 3 Lauterpacht concedes that the doctrine of the formal completeness of the law guarantees only die formal justiciability of disputes. Residual rules, such as the Lotus presumption, operate to prevent the possibility of a non liquet simply by providing a method for the formal foreclosure of claims, but this should not mask the existence of material gaps in the law. To fill these gaps, the judge must have regard to the However, general principles play a more fundamental role in Lauterpacht's construction of the judicial role because general principles, in the last analysis, are available to the judge to prevent the declaration of a non liquet. Lauterpacht formulates this as 'the prohibition of non liquet... only means that a court, otherwise endowed with jurisdiction, must not refuse to give a decision on the ground that the law is non-existent, or controversial, or uncertain and lacking in clarity'. the prohibition extended beyond contentious cases to advisory opinions. 56 For Lauterpacht, the prohibition was initially seen as an a priori self-evident proposition.
57
He subsequently argued that because the substantive and ethical inadequacies of international law could easily have been a strong inducement in favour of a non liquet declaration in given cases, 58 the prohibition is itself expressive of a principle of positive international law.
59
Lauterpacht notes that the question of non liquet has been associated with the problem of stability and change in international relations. More broadly, it has been associated with the relationship between law and justice. It has been argued that a prohibition on non liquet might make it impossible for a tribunal to avoid rendering a decision which, owing to the absence of an international legislature or some other effective law-making process, would result in injustice. Accordingly, it would be better if international tribunals could pronounce a non liquet, especially if the law is uncertain or controversial. Lauterpacht rejects this view, arguing that a rational solution does not lie in denying the principle that disputes should be settled on the basis of law.
60 Moreover, as disputes once submitted to a tribunal are justiciable and must be settled on the basis of law, he argues that this simply excludes a finding of non liquet.
61 A tribunal cannot be concerned with any ethical, political or economic shortcomings of the law, 62 but it is a legitimate aspect of the international judicial function if, while having no doubt as to the law as it is declared in its judgment, the tribunal draws attention to its shortcomings and makes a non-binding recommendation to the successful party for the voluntary modification of its rights.
63 Lauterpacht saw this facility as applicable in both contentious and advisory procedure: Judicial legislation is not -and ought not to be -like legislative codification by statute. It cannot attempt to lay down all the details of the application of the principle on which it is based. It lays down the broad principle and applies it to the case before it Its elaboration must be left, in addition to any doctrinal elucidation of the law by writers, to ordinary legislative processes or to future judicial decisions disposing of the problems as they arise.
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The clear conclusion to be drawn is that Lauterpacht views the international judicial function as one which is law creative, rather than as merely the elucidation of the specific legal relationships which obtain between the parties. Exhaustiveness of reasoning could thus be seen as yet another manifestation of gradual concretization through the specification of the conditions of application of norms. On occasion, this could involve the novel application of an existing principle which, but for that basis, would otherwise amount to judicial legislation. 82 Further, by the application of the doctrine of effectiveness, often ostensible judicial legislation amounts not to a change in the law but to the fulfilment of its purpose, 'a consideration which suggests that the border-line between judicial legislation and the application of the existing law may be less rigid than appears at first sight'. tion, which arises directly from his adherence to the doctrine of gradual concretization. The function of the International Court is, ultimately, to declare the law rather than the parties' own understanding of their legal relationships inter se.
VIL Lauterpacht's Assimilation of Law and Obligation
For our present purposes, it is unnecessary to determine whether Lauterpacht's rejection of the legal validity of automatic reservations was well founded. 103 More important in this context is the tension which Lauterpacht's concept of the judicial role introduces between law and obligation. 104 He acknowledges this distinction in his recognition that most rules of international law deal with subjective rights established by treaties rather than 'abstract rules of an objective nature'. 105 In contrast to the objectivity of law, an obligation is understood here as a legal relationship of restricted application which is peculiar to the parties to a case or to a given treaty.
In an early discussion of ex aequo et bono competence, and in particular of agreements by parties authorizing the Court to apply Article 38.2 of the Statute, Lauterpacht stated:
It is of no juridical importance that they contain an authorization to depart from the law as it existed before the ex aequo et bono agreement was made. The will of the parties is law.... The 'international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting States', are rules of law, and will be applied by the Court, even if they are in derogation of the customary rules of international law.... An international court will give effect to such provisions unless they are of an immoral character, or run counter to universally recognised principles of international law of an absolutely binding character.... It cannot be doubted that in deciding according to these rules of conduct specifically agreed to by the parties, the judges would be performing a strictly judicial function.
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auterpacht's apparent assimilation of law and obligation in his eventual construction of the judicial function fails to acknowledge this precise point, that parties can modify their legal relationships inter se.
A clear example of this arose in the Chinn case. 107 The special agreement which submitted this case to the Court was broad, asking whether the measures impugned were 'in conflict with the international obligations' 108 owed by Belgium to Great Britain. Both parties based their arguments on the 1919 St Germaine Convention on the International Regime regarding the Congo Basin: inter paries, this treaty had 
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Verzijl agreed with this minority view, arguing that the case presented 'a textbook case of international nullity' but that the Court had kept scrupulously to the special agreement between the parties and did not judge the validity of the concession from a general international legal point of view, but solely from an angle indicated by the parties, from which, however, a false light was cast on the problem.
111

Given his construction of the judicial role, it is possible, if not probable, that Lauterpacht would have inclined towards the method expressed by van Eysinga and
SchUcking. This serves only to expose the tension at the heart of Lauterpacht's thesis.
In his discussion of the Court's ex aequo et bono competence, Lauterpacht was willing to concede that in treaties states can modify their substantive legal entitlements under international law. That this admits of generalization is commonplace, reflected in the doctrinal distinction between ius dispositivum and ius cogens. Lauterpacht's adhesion to the doctrine of gradual concretization appears to eliminate any conceptual distinction between law and obligation. Agreements between subjects of the legal system are simply seen as the final substantive specification of the law, the 'abstract rules of an objective nature'. This cannot be reconciled with the existence of states' 'subjective rights' established in derogation of, or supplementary to, background international law. The assimilation of law and obligation also impacts upon the doctrine of effectiveness, as well as Lauterpacht's more general position that treaties must be interpreted according to the parties' intentions. Reference to the parties' intentions appears to be characteristic more of an obligation assumed by the parties inter se than of some objective externally imposing law. Moreover, this assimilation might conflict with the judicial interposition of arguments which are independent of the parties' submissions. It seems difficult to reconcile this with the view that the 'will of the parties is law'. If, as Lauterpacht argues, the exercise of the international judicial function takes place against the backdrop of the entirety of international law, 112 then mis must take account of the parties' agreements and understandings. In the absence of a countervailing ius cogens norm, the parties' determination of their substantive legal relationships inter se must take precedence over general international law in accordance with the principle lex spedalis derogat generali.
These considerations spill over into an evaluation of Lauterpacht's construction of the law creative aspect of the jurisprudence of the Internationa] Court He argues that the Court thoroughly examines the parties' pleadings and transcends the issue at hand. Accordingly, cases can be examined for the wider legal principles which lie behind the rules 'authoritatively laid down' by the Court: Undoubtedly, so long as the Court itself has not overruled its former pronouncement or so long as States have not, by a treaty of a general character, adopted a different formulation of the law, the ruling formally given by the Court on any question of international law must be considered as having settled, for the time being, the particular question at issue.
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Thus die proper function of the Court is to expound the general law, while deciding the individual case. The distortion introduced by Lauterpacht's assimilation of law and obligation here is manifest Unless a case turns solely on general customary law or upon a treaty of general application, then subjective legal relationships will be a factor in the decision. If the case implicates the parties' obligations inter se which substantively modify, supplement or derogate from general international law, then only by virtue of the doctrine of gradual concretization can the resultant judicial determination be deemed to declare objective and general law. It is apparent that this is paradoxical as it involves the illegitimate aggrandizement of particular relationships beyond the parties to have normative effect for the international community as a whole. This is not to say that judicial decisions are devoid of interest for nonparties, but it does indicate that Lauterpacht's belief in their objectivity must be attenuated. The better view would appear to approximate to that indicated by Fitzmaurice, namely that decisions of the International Court can be seen '[a]s "authority", but not necessarily as authoritative'.'' 4 Gradual concretization is an emanation of an imperative theory of law. For Kelsen and Lauterpacht the doctrine forges the chain of legal validity between the fundamental hypothesis of the legal system and the particular agreements made by individual subjects of the system, preserving the hierarchical and imperative line of command. Ultimately, all imperative meories reduce to that of duties -'the central and only essential element of the legal system'. 115 Yet it cannot be doubted that specific agreements can modify the general duties which would otherwise obtain between the parties. This at least connotes that the legal power to amend the substantive background law is as important as the general duties it establishes. In turn, if this is correct, then it indicates mat ultimate reduction of deontic operators to duties results in the adoption of an inadequate normative array. This manifests itself in the assimilation of law and obligation in Lauterpacht's concept of law. This has a current theoretical relevance. The influence of gradual concretization entails not only that treaties are a source of law, but also that they must be interpreted in accordance with the parties' intentions. This appears to set up the opposition which Koskenniemi has labelled 'apology' and 'utopia':
To sustain the distinction between international law and politics doctrine assumed the former to be more objective than the latter. It assumed that legal norms could be both concrete and normative. The requirement of concreteness related to the need to verify the law's content not against some political principles but by reference to the concrete behaviour, will and interest of States. The requirement of nomaalivity related to the capacity of the law to be opposable to State policy. But these requirements tended to overrule each other. A doctrine with much concreteness seemed to lose its normative value and end up in descriptive apology. A truly normative doctrine created a gap between itself and State practice in a manner which made doubtful the objectivity of the method of verifying its norms. It ended up in undemonstrable Utopias.
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This extent of opposition is surely eroded or reduced if the normative structure of a legal system is seen to include the distinction between general law and particular obligations. The latter are concrete, particularly if understood within the framework of Lauterpacht's doctrine of effectiveness. If states conclude an agreement, then surely it is by reference to their intentions and understandings that the extent of that legal relationship is determined. In this light, the essence of obligations is that the substantive relationships they create are not objective, albeit that their binding force or normativity is dependent on the general rules which authorize their creation. In short, the objective normative code does not override, but facilitates, the legal expression of individual states' will or interest 117 Indeed, simply to conceive of international law as an overriding normative code is to reduce its normative array to that of duties. This indicates that, like Lauterpacht's doctrine of gradual concretization, the apology/utopia opposition appears to fail to give enough weight to the law/obligation dichotomy. The issue of whether the apology/utopia opposition collapses further -for instance, if custom formation is seen as the incremental generalization of specific legal relationships by virtue of the doctrines of preclusion and acquiescence and thus as a normative outcome of concrete behaviour -goes beyond the bounds of this paper. The point here is that the pervasiveness of this opposition is exaggerated through a failure to distinguish between law and obligation. Having rejected this customary basis for the prohibition. Stone concludes that if it forms part of positive law it must arise from general principles.
VIQ. Non Uquet
129 This he also rejects. In municipal systems, non liquet is prohibited by express enactment or by custom. Thus, for Lauterpacht, the prohibition was a general principle to be applied by international tribunals. Stone concedes that the municipal prohibition is so general that it is often deemed to arise from the necessary completeness of legal systems or from the inherent nature of the judicial function. However, he holds this recourse to municipal analogy to be unwarranted and dangerous, given the differences in the exercise of international judicial powers.
130 Stone also rejects the other aspect of Lauterpacht's argument, that general principles may be used to meet new situations. He claims that even if general principles are an inexhaustible source of legal material, this does not free the judge from making law-creative choices in areas where a declaration of non liquet would be a conceptual possibility. Principles simply do not direct the court to a final decision with the compulsion of a legal command.
131
Stone's own view stems from the proposition that, logically, legal systems can be either open or closed. A legal system is closed if it contains either a residual principle which covers unprovided for cases, or a norm which forbids the judge to refuse to decide a case on the basis of the absence or the obscurity of law. The latter thus enjoins the judge to create rules where no pre-existing applicable law can be found. Regardless of which alternative is employed, the legal system is closed and thus excludes the possibility of non liquet.^ However, there is no a priori basis for claiming that a closing rule exists in any particular legal order, and thus no rule regarding non liquet imposes itself as a matter of logic. Consequently, a rule which permits or requires a declaration of non liquet is, in principle, conceivable. On this basis. Stone asserts that a legal prohibition of non liquet must be based on positive law.
133
Stone underpins his claim that non liquet is a judicial possibility by employing propositional deontic logic.
134 Stone identifies three principal deontic modalitiesthe obligatory, the prohibitory, and the permissory -and also the modality of legal neutrality. The last refers to the situation where the legal system contains no rule bearing on a given act or omission which is conceivable as legally regulated behaviour. The system is simply silent on the matter. This entails that not all conduct which is legally permissible is so by virtue of a rule specifically permitting that behaviour. It might be permitted merely because of the absence of any pertinent rule. For Stone, conduct which is legally neutral must not be confused with that which is specifically permitted by a rule. It must be stressed that the ensuing discussion of this opinion is not intended to be a substantive analysis which goes to die merits of the issues involved. Rather it is solely intended to examine the analytical issues of legal system structure which a non liquet declaration raises. It follows that, so far as this case at any rate is concerned, the principle on which the Court acts, be it one of prohibition or one of authorization, leaves no room unoccupied by law and consequently no space available to be filled by the non liquet doctrine or by ar- guments traceable to it The fact that these are advisory proceedings and not contentious ones makes no difference; the law to be applied is the same in both cases. the previous stress on the individual sovereignty of each State considered as hortus conclusus has been inclining before a new awareness of the responsibility of each State as a member of a more cohesive and comprehensive system based on cooperation and interdependence.... The Chatter did not, of course, establish anything like world government; but it did organise international relations on the basis of an 'international system'; and fundamental to that system was an assumption that the human species and its civilization would continue.
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Quite simply, in the Lotus the Court did not have in mind acts which could destroy the planet and to that extent it was distinguishable.
159
Judge Shahahtiddten's views have been canvassed at length because only he really explores the implications of the Lotus presumption. Similarly, only he and President Bedajoui argue that it can be distinguished on the ground that the structure of international law has changed in a way which invalidates the conceptual foundations of the presumption. This is perhaps surprising, given the apparent relationship which exists between Lotus and non liquet.
XL Refloating the Lotus
Doctrinally, apart from Lauterpacht and Stone, Fitzmaurice also casts doubt on the Lotus presumption. He notes that the compromis had employed the phrase 'not in conflict with the principles of international law' in setting out the standard by which Turkish conduct should be assessed. This, he argues, precludes the presumption from being considered as an abstract and independent rule of law. The Court can be regarded as applying the criterion of non-conflict with the principles of international law because the Compromis directed it to do so, rather than because this criterion had any abstract validity. ... Had the Court been asked to determine whether the Turkish action was in conformity with international law, the decision would almost certainly have been die other way 160
Judicial and doctrinal opinion therefore inclines towards the position that the Lotus presumption is discredited. The view that changes in the structure of the international legal order have undermined the cogency of the Lotus may be appealing, but it is nevertheless the case that the presumption expresses an analytical axiom. This is a matter of legal system structure rather than one of the weight to be accorded to an aging precedent or of the existence of a substantive rule of positive law.
To understand the true import of the axiom, a clear distinction must be drawn between a (Hohfeldian) right and a privilege. To hold that someone has a right entails that someone else has a duty to bring about or maintain the state of affairs en-visaged by that right. 161 For instance, someone's right to free speech entails that someone else (paradigmatically the state) has the duty to ensure that conditions which foster free speech exist; or my right to my watch entails that no one should deprive me of it To use Holmstrom-Hintikka's example, if someone has the right to die (by way of euthanasia or assisted suicide), then this entails that someone else has die duty to ensure that death occurs. Hohfeldian privileges (or liberties) do not impose duties on others. The essence of a Hohfeldian privilege is die absence of both a right with the same substantive content and of a contrary duty.
This can best be illustrated by example, one which I hope is less morally contentious than the use of nuclear weapons or assisted death. I like drinking whisky but, strictly, I have no right to do so (even if this can be seen as a cultural 'right' which attaches to Scotsmen). I only have the liberty or privilege to drink whisky. No one else is under a legal duty to ensure that I can drink whisky. For instance, I cannot demand that a distillery makes whisky for me or even that someone sells it to me. I am under no duty to drink whisky but nor am I, in principle, prohibited from doing so.
However, as it stands, this privilege to drink whisky is atomized and isolated. There are situations when other considerations have a countervailing force and in which my liberty to drink whisky is excluded. For example, in some Scottish cities it is unlawful to drink alcohol in parks or other public places. This prohibition imposes a duty on me not to drink whisky in parks, thus displacing my privilege. This is surely a trivial example, but it lays the basis both to dispose of Stone's foundation for his claim that no prohibition of rum liquet exists, and also to demonstrate the enduring vitality of the Lotus presumption.
Stone's argument is ultimately predicated on prepositional deontic logic. However, it is clear that deontic modalities can be assigned to propositions only within the context of a momentary legal system: A momentary legal system contains all the laws of a system valid at a certain moment These are not usually all the laws of a system. An English law enacted in 1906 and repealed in 1927 and an English law enacted in 1948 belong to the same legal system. Yet there is no momentary legal system to which both belong, because they were never valid at one and the same moment 1 '
52
Metaphorically, the momentary system is a snapshot of a legal system frozen at some instant Within a momentary system, Stone could easily assign deontic value to legal propositions. He could determine that a given act is obligatory or permitted or pro- hibited, or even that it is not clear whether a given act is permitted or prohibited because, for instance, it raises an interpretative problem or presents a novel issue. However, Stone's deontic logic can neither transcend the boundaries of a momentary system nor take account of the legal value of principles. Legal principles -whether principles of international law as such or analogies drawn from municipal systems -have a variable legal force that is context dependent Principles may or may not be applicable, or the operation of one may negate the operation of another, in a given situation. As Stone states, the operation of legal principles does not have 'the compulsion of a legal command'.
163 Accordingly, even within a momentary system, Stone cannot assign deontic value to principles. His analysis is therefore only concerned with rules, but this cannot give a full account of a legal system. His normative array is simply inadequate.
Further, his analysis results in logical atomization, as deontic value can only be assigned to specific propositions detached from their systemic context To return to my example. Stone would have to affirm both mat I was permitted to drink whisky and prohibited from drinking whisky in parks, with each being seen as an isolated and unrelated proposition. This means that even within a momentary system, Stone cannot take account of internal relations between norms, that is the way in which a rule (or principle) can affect the interpretation or application of another. 164 His analysis cannot account for the fact that the deontic value of a given proposition can be amended when it is relocated within the overall context of the legal system. Nor can Stone's argument transcend momentary systems. By inter alia denying judicial creativity, he denies that the deontic value of propositions in one momentary system can be changed to create another momentary system. Every act of judicial interpretation involves a degree of judicial creativity -the judge adds something which was not there before. Lauterpacht of course, would argue that this is the inevitable result of the gradual concretization of law. Through his inability to recognize internal relations between norms and the force of legal principles, Stone cannot account for the temporal unity of the international legal system and condemns the international judge to paralysis. In essence, Stone's concept of the international legal order is one of an atomized set, and not an integrated system, of rules. 165 
And Finally
Each temporal legal community, perhaps particularly the academic legal community, has its own concerns and fixations that it addresses and, once addressed, the focus of concern moves on to other issues. Some concerns, however, are constant, although they may reappear in different guises at different times. Although methods -and particularly the terminology -of analysis have changed, Lauterpacht's analysis of the international judicial function, and thus ultimately the nature of international law, is still instructive and worth consideration. It retains a contemporary resonance. Modern international lawyers might wish to pursue this enterprise within the framework of tendencies towards apology and Utopia but, in any event, Lauterpacht had already anticipated this argument by adverting to the perennial problem with which the science of international law has been confronted almost from the start. It has been exposed to the inducement to supply a rationalization of 
